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The process of acquiring major weapon systems is the
largest, most complex and dollar consuming process in the
Department of Defense. The cycle from concept to delivery
may require five to ten years. Consequently, decision-
making responsibility for these systems rests with the
highest organization levels in the DOD . Within the param-
eters of complex constraints and pressures, two major pro-
cesses occur simultaneously: (1) the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) —the acquisition process
and (2) the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) —the funding process. An understanding of the inter-
relationship between the DSARC and PPBS process is believed
to be the key to the development of a framework for compre-
hending decisions concerning major weapon systems. The
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This thesis is concerned with the major weapon systems
decision-making process within the Department of Defense
(DOD) . Since it appears that funds will continue to be con-
strained within the Department of Defense, it is imperative
that any potential program manager within the DOD structure
be well aware of both the budgeting and program decision-
making processes and their specific current and potential
"state-of-the-art" procedures.
It has become increasingly apparent that DOD has, in past
years, initiated more programs than the current and antici-
pated Defense budget will support [38:68]. Due to the com-
plexity of modern weapons and rising expenditures for
personnel, our Defense systems are ever increasingly more
expensive to procure, operate, and support. These rising
costs combined with a relatively constant acquisition budget
for major weapon systems have resulted in a "bow wave" of
programs awaiting funding, adding up to approximately one
third of the production budget. This funding problem has
been further aggravated by the downward trend in defense
buying power since the Vietnam War. Additionally, to make
the available funds reach further, other programs have been
stretched out to rates much below those which are cost effec-
tive. This in turn makes unit costs even higher and creates
a "double bow wave."

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
It is therefore the contention of the researcher that
this thesis should serve the primary purpose of establishing
the significant interface points in the decision-making pro-
cess between the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) and Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
cycles in order to enable military program managers to suc-
cessfully develop and procure weapon systems efficiently and
economically. The basic research question to be answered is
"What are the significant interface points in the decision-
making process in the Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council and Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
cycles and how might they be improved?" Subsidiary questions
that will also be answered are: (1) What are the DSARC and
PPBS processes ? (2) Where do these processes typically
interact and when does this occur? and (3) What are the key
or significant problems with these interfaces?
The following chapters are oriented to provide background
information that will serve as both a learning experience
for any potential program manager as well as the framework
for development of the central objective of this endeavor:
identifying the interfaces between the DSARC and PPVS decision-
making cycles and where they may be improved. Because of
certain limitations due to geographic location, much of the
research was done by literature search and interviews.

C. SCOPE
Due to the broad scope of the topic, this research has
been limited to the major interfaces that occur at the Office
of Secretary of Defense (OSD) level. The impact on the mili-
tary services and program managers is a topic that merits a
separate paper.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
It is assumed that the reader has some knowledge of the
acquisition process and the Department of Defense (DOD) organi-
zation. In order to provide more clarity to the DOD language,
definitions are contained throughout the thesis and a consoli-
dated listing of the definitions is contained in Appendices A
and B for ready reference.
E. METHODOLOGY
As stated earlier the methodology of study for this thesis
is primarily one of literature review. To add to and expand
this, interviews with key top management DOD officials were
conducted to get the opinions, ideas and criticisms of the
implementors and decision-makers in the DSARC and PPBS cycles.
Lists of the questions and topics addressed and the people
interviewed are contained in Appendices D and C.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This study is organized as follows: Chapter II provides
the background information that will examine both the DSARC
and PPBS processes as they evolved. Chapter III provides an
overview of the DSARC process within the DOD with emphasis
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on the timing of various events as well as the players involved
in the attainment of the finished product.
Chapter IV examines the PPBS process within the DOD with
an analysis based on both historical and current perspectives.
The recent emergence of Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) within the
PPBS structure will be explored, particularly the evolution
of the overall concept.
Chapter V will take the concepts presented earlier and will
develop and identify the various areas of interface. It will
also address those areas in which interfaces are necessary
but are apparently lacking.
Chapter VI examines the problem areas identified in the
previous chapter in detail. It develops arguments for and
against proposed solutions.
Chapter VII will briefly summarize the entire thesis report
and allow the researcher the opportunity to make some closing
comments concerning some of the conclusions drawn and recom-
mentations made during the course of this endeavor.
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The cost of National Defense has been one of the most
controversial subjects over the past several years, and it
appears it will continue to be debated for years to come.
Public pressure has strengthened congressional and adminis-
tration determination to hold the defense budget down due
to the impact of inflation, energy, and rapidly increasing
personnel costs. The area most affected by the decrease in
real buying power is the acquisition of military hardware
and weapon systems.
The need for better defense system management has demanded
a more efficient process for selecting systems to be developed
and produced. Defense systems normally evolve either as a
result of continuing research and development efforts of the
military service and defense contractors or through further
engineering and development of systems already in being.
These problems of reduced real buying power, outside DOD
pressures, and requirements for better management directly




The Secretary of Defense has the statutory authority and
responsibility to direct and control the weapon systems
acquisition process. The Secretary can delegate much of his
authority and must do so as a practical matter. In order to
place current system acquisition policy in perspective, it
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may be useful to review the background leading to the current
policy.
The system acquisition history in the 1950' s was dominated
by several major developments, including the development of
nuclear weaponry, the Korean War, and the missile and space
race, which was perceived as a technology race against the
Soviets. These developments created a sense of urgency which
resulted in the procurement of major systems using a high
degree of concurrency with compressed time schedules for
development and production. As a result, cost growth, poor
performance, and duplication of design and effort were preva-
lent among the services.
At the end of the 1950 's it became obvious that better
management practices would have to be developed if the ever-
growing amounts of money demanded for major systems acquisi-
tion were to be spent efficiently. For example, over $1.5
billion was spent on the B-70 [35:63]. In this program, the
delivery schedule lagged badly and costs escalated because
it was subject to too many reorientations as to the need of
the system. While the program produced substantial advances
in technology which were incorporated into other programs, a
substantial amount of funds were spent in coordinating sub-
system development, integrating logistics and training con-
siderations in its design and production capability
development. The B-70 project was only one of a number of
systems that ran into trouble. In their study, " The Weapons
Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis, " Peck and Scherer
14

provided detailed information on a number of major weapon
systems developed in the 1950's [35:70]. In general, the
study showed that costs had more than tripled during the
acquisition cycle and that schedules had slipped signifi-
cantly even though technical goals had been met.
It was generally believed that these results were
caused by: (1) excessive control of proyrams by technical
personnel who "goldplated" the item to the detriment of cost
and schedule, (2) premature initiation of production of both
systems and subsystems before development could be completed,
(3) lack of useful management control systems, and (4) exces-
sive use of Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contracts [35:85].
The Secretary of Defense, beginning in 1960, made signifi-
cant policy changes in an effort to correct weaknesses in the
system acquisition process. This effort resulted in several
revisions to DOD directives. A coordinated framework was the
"building block" established for policy formulation and imple-
mentation for DOD system acquisition. Policy formulation and
decision making shifted from the services to the highest
levels of DOD. The rationale given for the creation of a
strong Research and Development (R and D) Executive in the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR and E)
(now known as Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering} in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was
in large measure based on the need for rapid decision-making
to reduce lead time. The practice of a high degree of con-
currency in development and production became the accepted
15

norm. Though concurrency makes sense in programs dealing
with national security, in most other programs it proved to
be an over reaction resulting in unnecessary costs.
Since 1969, several studies have been conducted by the
President and Department of Defense to specifically address
the performance and efficiency of the Department. The major
study was performed by the Defense Blue Ribbon Panel,
appointed by the President and the Secretary of Defense in
July 1969. This Panel acknowledged that the operation and
management of the Department is complex and not adaptable to
conventional management. It reported that "it operates in
a highly volatile environment, subject to many pressures
and conditions which are largely beyond the control and
often beyond the influence of those primarily responsible
for Defense management." [46:17] The shifts in national
policies and priorities, with the accompanying shifts in the
range of United States commitments, were identified as major
factors causing the problems in management. Despite these
factors, the Panel clearly indicated that there are numerous
actions which could be taken by the Department of Defense to
improve efficiency and public confidence.
The Defense Blue Ribbon Panel Report was submitted in
July 197 0, and implementation of the recommended actions has
been very slow and limited. It appears that the recommenda-
tions for increased staffing in selected areas such as test
and evaluation, received relatively prompt action, as they
are expansions of the bureaucracy which creates billets. The
16

recommendations, however, for decreases in bureaucratic layer-
ing and paperwork to increase efficiency and reduce costs have
been slow in forthcoming. The problems of implementation were
addressed by Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements,
in March 1974, when speaking of the refinements of the acqui-
sition procedures, he said:
I want to place emphasis on the fact that we have
come a long way since our present policies and
methods of doing business were established. I partici-
pated in establishing these policies through the Blue
Ribbon Panel work and its recommendations as adopted
in 1970. It was and is a great plan, and I say that
in all modesty, because there were many people contri-
buting to it and it was well done. But we must do a
far better job of implementation of that plan that
we have got to bring about [4:3],
Although Secretary Clements emphasized that implementation
was the key factor, what resulted were additional studies
within the Army and Navy.
Although somewhat more detailed in selected areas, the
recommendations by both Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Review
Council (NMARC) and Army Material Acquisition Review Committee
(AMARC) on the major organization, management, and acquisition
procedural problems closely paralleled the recommendations of
the Defense Blue Ribbon Panel [1:11].
In 1971 the principles and procedures of the Department
of Defense Acquisition Directive, including such things as
milestone checkpoints, experimental prototypes, fly-before-
buy, greater emphasis on operational test and evaluation
before production, all contributed to the reduction of con-
currency and high risk. This process eventually led to a
17

formalized decision-making body which is known today as the
Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
.
Recent trends toward decentralized decision making within
the Department of Defense increase the importance of thorough
program review within the Services. For example, Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction identifies the pro-
gram review process as "... the principal means for monitoring
acquisition programs..." and establishes levels of decision
authority for program review and approval based on funding
thresholds [15:4], The advocacy role of the program manager
is balanced at the major milestone decision points by the
broader awareness of those in higher management positions.
Up until the 1970' s the schedule has been the force
behind the acquisition cycle. The danger now may well be
the pendulum is again overswinging and that costly and
unproductive delays are increasingly being imposed on programs
through the milestone process. Whether the DSARC process has
resulted in this, with its implementation, is difficult to
ascertain. The OSD staff is almost uniformly of the opinion
that the current DSARC process, although it can and should be
improved, has been and will remain essential to the achieve-
ment of weapon systems management [57]
.
DOD officials interviewed point to the importance of
adversary procedures in program management reviews which they
feel never can be attained within the Services. The Services,
on the other hand, strongly disagree and maintain that the
level of detail and frequency of current activity in the
18

DSARC process is a major mangement problem, blurs program
accountability and responsibilities, detracts from the pro-
gram manager's attention to important problems and require-
ments within his program, and causes unnecessary delays,
costs and instabilities in programs [50] [58].
Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard originally intended
that the DSARC would serve to complement the Decision Coordi-
nating Paper (DCP) process [1:12], In this procedure, the
final revisions of DCPs were not to be prepared until after
holding a DSARC review, which would permit coordinated evalu-
ation and deliberation among senior managers to assure that
advice given to the Secretary of Defense would be as complete
and objective as possible prior to a decision to proceed to
the next step in a system's acquisition cycle [1:14], Hope-
fully, by assembling these principles, certain issues would
be resolved prior to passing the DCP to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense for decision rather than forcing him to take a
stand when all his senior advisors were taking different
positions from one another on issues other than the major
ones.
While Mr. Packard was a firm advocate of participatory
management, he reserved for OSD the decision-making responsi-
bility regarding whether a particular program should be con-
tinued at various decision points in its life cycle,
particularly since such continuance is directly related to
DOD's long-term objectives and budget problems. The DSARC
meetings were to be used to evaluate the managerial perform-
ance of the Services in implementing approved policies and
19

to make decisions on proceeding into the next phase in each
major acquisition program. The three points in a system's
acquisition cycle at which Mr. Packard felt that a DSARC
should be convened are:
1. When initiation of a program is proposed.
2. When transition from the validation phase to full-
scale development is proposed.
3. When transition from development into production
for service deployment is proposed [1:17].
A significant change introduced by the Packard DCP/DSARC
process was the increased emphasis placed on achieving
technical performance as well as cost and schedule goals in
one phase of the acquisition cycle before entering the next
phase. This emphasis on performance was significantly
different from the prior major emphasis on cost and schedule
milestones
.
In the early to mid 1970 's, procedures were put together
which had an unequivocal impact on the defense system
acquisition. Prior to the actual issuance of DOD Directive
5000.1, two particularly significant memoranda were issued
by DEPSECDEF Packard. These memoranda became the basis for
much of the mechanism and policy used in this directive. The
first was the 30 May 1969 Memorandum, Establishment of a
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council, which resulted
from Mr. Packard's initial review of system acquisition
management in the Department of Defense. The second memor-
andum, dated 28 May 1970, Policy Guidance on Major Weapon
System Acquisition, was written after a year's study of the
20

acquisition process by Mr. Packard and his staff. This
memorandum set the final tone for the issuance of the DOD
Directive. New policy guidance in this memorandum concerned
system acquisition management, conceptual development, full-
scale development, production and contracts. In addition,
the decentralization of management in systems acquisition
was emphasized [1:4].
With two major building blocks in the acquisition process
established, the DSARC and significant new acquisition policy,
the formal document, DOD Directive 5000.1 was issued. This
document restated the policy previously established and went
into greater detail in delineating the responsibilities of
OSD and the DOD components. Additionally, a more detailed
description of program considerations was included. These
considerations were: CI) a statement of the system need in
operational terms and its repeated challenging, (2) consider-
ation of cost parameters to include acquisition and life-
cycle costs, (3) logistic support, (4) use of milestones,
(5) assessment of technical uncertainty, (6) increased use
of test and evaluation, (7) contract form consistent with
program characteristics, (8) source selection considerations
and (9) use of realistic management information-program
control requirements.





Any system used to manage the allocation of an organiza-
tion's resources should be made up of a set of functions and
procedures intended to help management decide on its objec-
tives, and monitor the subsequent execution and realization
of its objectives [41:1].
The "system" must be sufficiently flexible to permit
adapting the specific functions and procedures that accomplish
these tasks to the management style of the system decision
makers [2:90].
The art of budgeting is dynamic in nature and has been
subject to reform throughout the history of the United States.
The basic products of the reform movement include: line item
budgeting, performance budgeting, and Planning, Programming
and Budgeting. These products represent the basic evolution
of the present Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS)
.
"Budget Reform," Charles Beard wrote during the first
period of budget innovation in the early years of the
Twentieth Century, "bears the imprint of the age in which it
was oriented." [2:95] This observation has proven to be of
a timeless quality since the products of budget reform have
reflected the particular conception of the budget function
as perceived at the specific time of its innovation.
Although every budget process includes aspects of control,
management and planning, one function tends to predominate
[43:4], This predominance comes about due to the inherent
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competitiveness of the functions; emphasis on one diminishes
use of the others. During each period of budget reform the
control-management-planning balance was changed to reflect
the particular emphasis associated with "the needs of the
time.
"
The basic product of the first period of budget reform
was emphasis on line item budgeting as an attempt to satisfy
the need for expenditure control. This period of reform
included the years between the passage of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 and the Hoover Commission Report of
1949. This line item approach to budgeting derived from the
bureaucratic condition common to modern government. These
conditions evolved from the desire of government to prevent
financial improprieties and for limiting agency spending to
authorized levels. Due to this concern with respect to
fiduciary responsibility, government budgeting inevitably
"begins with indispensable efforts to prompt 'accountability 1
by preventing public funds from being stolen, used for
unauthorized purposes, or spent at uncontrolled rates...".
While the control function was well defined in this line item
orientation, the management and planning aspects of the budget
were not properly developed [23:117].
The second product of the budget reform movement,
performance budgeting, was as unifunctional as the line item
budgeting approach with a different functional emphasis.
Performance budgeting emphasized the management side of
budgeting with the control and planning aspects of budgeting
23

being decentralized or dispersed. Performance budgeting
has as its principal thrust an attempt to improve work
efficiency by means of activity classification and work/cost
measurements
.
It was demonstrated in the budget reform movement that
both line item and performance budgeting were obviously
much too unifunctional to be totally effective.
Prior to 1961, military planning and financial management
was being conducted independently. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and planning agencies of the military departments conducted
military planning while the Comptroller was responsible for
financial management. This system led to piecemeal resource
management with imbalances in the overall Department of
Defense Plan.
The inherent problems associated with such a fragmented
system of managing resources brought to light the need to
establish a system to bridge the gap between planning and
budgeting. In the early 1960's, the bridge was referred to
as the programming system but by 1963, the Planning, Pro-
gramming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) was operating for the
Department of Defense.
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System tPPBS)
has a multi-purpose perspective. While PPB regards planning
as the central budget function, it does not negate the need
for control and management and informational structures
oriented to these functions. PPB has therefore been found to
be an efficient vehicle to enable policymakers to evaluate
24

the costs and benefits of alternative expenditure proposals.
The PPBS that has evolved from the basic PPB concept is
therefore the "state of the art" with respect to the optimum
balance of the control-mainagement-planning aspects of budget-
ing that confronted the Federal Government.
Changes in the way the Defense Department conducted its
business continued during the years of Robert McNamara's
service as Secretary of Defense. Many of these changes were
initiated by Mr. Charles Hitch. It was in this period that
the focus shifted to the decision-making area, to the selec-
tion of meaningful national defense objectives as the basis
for management and to determinations of the resources needed
to meet these objectives, with cost-effectiveness techniques
used to evaluate and decide among alternative proposals
[29:52] .
v
This shift in focus led to development of the DOD program-
ming systems which bridge the gap between planning and
budgeting. Programming is the function by which proposed
goals for the next five years, and resources required to
achieve them, are decided upon yearly.
Although programming closed the gap between planning and
budgeting, by making them into essentially one process, they
remained separately oriented. Planning was based on missions,
whereas budgeting was based on Congressional appropriation
classifications. Furthermore, accounting on which both
planning and budgeting depend for information, was based on




Some of these problems included the following: (1) there
was no means of tracing the results of decisions through the
budgeting and implementing phases or of obtaining useful
information to assist in future decisions, (2) budget classi-
fications tended to lead to over-centralized management for
a wide spectrum of individual items of expense, and (3) the
general inability to collect meaningful data for cost-effec-
tiveness studies of resource utilization often made it neces-
sary to conduct costly ad-hoc studies to get information
that should have been readily available from the regular
management accounting systems.
When Dr. Anthony was appointed Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) , he was asked by SECDEF McNamara to
make major changes in programming, budgeting and accounting
systems, as necessary to ensure consistency and comparability
among them.
During 1965, President Lyndon Johnson directed all depart-
ments and agencies of the federal government to adopt a
planning, programming and budgeting system. During the imple-
mentation phase of PPBS, Charles L. Schultze, then Director
of the United States Bureau of the Budget, announced six goals
of programming budgeting: [41:7-9]
1. Careful identification and examination of goals
and objectives in each area of government activity.
2. Analysis of the output of a given program in terms
of its objectives.
3. Measurement of total programming costs, not for
just one year but for several years in the future.
26

4. Formulation of objectives and programs extending
beyond the single year of the annual budget to
long-term objectives.
5. Analysis alternatives to find the most efficient
ways of reaching program objectives for the least
cost.
6. Establishment of analytic procedures to serve as
a systemic part of the budget review process.
As could be expected of any new system within the Federal
Government, PPBS met with varying degrees of success with
respect to its implementation. While some departments and
agencies adjusted quite well to the new game inherent in
PPBS, others failed to go beyond a "first step" posture with
respect to PPBS implementation. .The Department of Defense,
however, proved to be fertile ground for the growth of this
new approach to budgeting and PPBS has not only survived but
in reality has actually thrived in the DOD environment.
In order to meet the goals established by both SECDEF
McNamara and President Johnson, Dr. Anthony initiated the
Resource Management System (RMS) and Project PRIME. The con-
cepts behind RMS and Project PRIME were to have an operating
budget instead of allotments to the different activities,
purify appropriations, incorporate accurate accounting and
establish uniform expense accounting structures.
The system of planning-programming-budgeting conceptually
relates three facts: (1) a desired outcome (planning)
,
(2) the structuring of methods for achieving the outcome
(programming) , and (3) the funds available to accomplish the
end result (budgeting) . The planning function is the first
phase from which attempts are made to make government
27

operations more efficient and effective by improving the
allocation of public resources between competing needs
[29:19]
.
Recent developments pertinent to PPBS include the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBICA)
of 1974 which had several changes that affected the Defense
resource allocation process. For example, under the CBICA
the Congress declared it essential to assure effective
congressional control over the budget process. This includes
control and the determination of the levels of revenues and
expenditures.
Also in 1977, the Carter Administration required federal
adoption of Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) procedures. Zero-
Based Budgeting is an operating and budgeting process which
requires each manager to justify his entire budget request
in detail from scratch, and shifts the burden of proof to
each manager to justify why he should spend any money at all.
This approach requires that all activities be identified in
"decision packages" which will be evaluated by systematic
analysis, and ranked in order of importance [37:14].
Secretary Brown, with OMB agreement, said that DOD would "be
able to call from our PPBS system the basic data that will
be required to assure effective implementation of the ZBB
system.
"
Several recent modifications to Defense PPBS introduced
by Secretary Brown demonstrated that the Defense resource
allocation evolves to meet the perceived needs of each period
28

and to accommodate different styles of leadership. While one
objective was to shorten and simplify PPBS, the modifications
are viewed by many participants as complicating an already
busy annual cycle by interposing a third major benchmark for




III. DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION REVIEW COUNCIL
A. INTRODUCTION
Although the system acquisition process terminology has
undergone numerous changes, the basic process by which a
need is transformed into an operational system remains essen-
tially unchanged.
For management purposes, the life cycle of a major system
can be broken down into five major phases (Mission Area
Analysis, Alternative Systems Concepts/Exploration, Demon-
stration and Validation, Full-Scale Engineering Development,
and Production) with a DCP decision between adjacent stages,
except for the first two. See Figure 1.
The DSARC reviews major programs and ensures they are
ready for transition from one program phase to another. The
Council also reviews programs where a DCP threshold has been
breached, where there is a major reorientation of the program,
or where the threat changes.
The policy implementing directives, DODD 5000.1 and
5000.2 reflect the concept of maintaining viable options for
meeting mission needs throughout the acquisition cycle. The
DSARC makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
regarding continuance, redirection or cancellation of a
program based on its current status and the current needs of
the DOD. In order to understand what happens in this decision-











































































Briefly the mission of the DSARC is to review major
system acquisition programs at appropriate and significant
milestone decision points to permit coordinated evaluation
and deliberation among senior managers and to assure that
complete and objective recommendations are given to SECDEF
concerning the acquisition of major systems, The DSARC
recommendations are used by the SECDEF as the basis for his
decisions regarding program status.
The DSARC is composed of the following members: (1) Defense
Acquisition Executive (DAE) (Chairman), (2) Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering (currently assigned
the position of DAE) , (3) Assistant Secretary of Defense
(ASD) (Manpower), Reserve Affairs and Logistics, (4) Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ASD) (Comptroller)
, (5) Assistant
Secretary of Defense (ASD) (International Security Affairs)
,
(6) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program, Analysis and
Evaluation)
, (7) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communica-
tions, Command, Control and Intelligence), and (8) Advisor
to SECDEF on NATO Affairs. Other participants include:
(1) Service Acquisition Executive, (2) Joint Chiefs of Staff
Representative, (3) Defense Intelligence Agency Representa-
tive, (4) Cost Analysis Improvement Group Chairman, and (5)
Director, Defense Test and Evaluation [57]
.
Each participating member has certain responsibilities
for which he is accountable to SECDEF. The SECDEF holds
primary responsibility for the key decisions at the transition
between phases of the acquisition cycle and monitors the
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program between decision points. From program inception to
phase out, the Service Component has primary responsibility
for program execution in accordance with SECDEF decisions.
The SECDEF decision-making process is supported by formal
review procedures. (See Figure 1.)
In the Mission Area Analysis phase the SECDEF, with the
Service Components, will establish mission areas to reflect
the several operating categories essential to accomplish the
Defense mission. The Service Component Heads are responsible
for the identification and definition of mission element
needs and for initiatives to acquire new system capabilities
essential to meet these needs.
At the request of the SECDEF or upon making a determina-
tion that a valid mission element need exists and a major
system acquisition program is required to acquire a new sys-
tem capability or a modification to an existing capability,
the Service Component Head submits a description of the
mission need to the Secretary of Defense, recommending
approval of the mission and requesting authority to proceed
with identification of alternative system design concepts
as solutions to the need. SECDEF approval is required prior
to the commitment of funds to the systematic and progressive
identification of alternative concepts. This is done at
Milestone 0. Such action to initiate a system acquisition




The Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) is used to
recommend the initiation of a new system acquisition program
at Milestone 0. It documents the mission need and the
essential supporting and planning information that may be
required.
The MENS is then forwarded through the Defense Acquisi-
tion Executive to the SECDEF for approval. The SECDEF
decision sets the conditions for program initiation and may
be directed to more than one Service Component [13:6],
As a result of the competitive identification and explora-
tion of alternative design concepts, the Service Component
Head may conclude that the demonstration and validation phase
should (1) involve several alternatives; (2) be limited to
a single system concept; (3) involve alternative subsystems
only and not be conducted at the system level; or (4) there
should be no demonstration and the program should proceed
directly into full-scale engineering development. A Decision
Coordinating Paper (DCP) is prepared for the Milestone I
decision recommending preferred alternatives for the Demon-
stration and Validation phase [13:6],
An important point to note here is that the Service
Component Heads are not authorized to commit funds to the
identification and exploration of alternative system design
concepts to meet a mission need prior to the approval of a
MENS by the SECDEF and the completion of action required by
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
.
SECDEF decisions at Milestones I, II, and III which are
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reflected in the MENS or DCP are included in the FYDP docu-
mentation at the next Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
submission or Program/Budget decision submission depending
on the timing of the DCP. When a PPBS document offers an
alternative solution that differs from the SECDEF decision
as stated in the MENS or DCP, the difference will be clearly
noted in the PPBS document and submitted to the DAE for
coordination. These PPBS differences are reviewed and
approved by SECDEF and incorporated into a revised DCP
(13:8] .
Upon completion of the Demonstration and Validation phase,
the Service Component shall update the DCP to recommend the
selection of a system for Full-Scale Engineering Develop-
ment and Production. The DCP shall address the total program
through completion. The Milestone II decision is a commit-
ment to continue the program through the engineering develop-
ment phase and includes procurement of long lead materials.
Finally, upon completion of the engineering development
phase including the initial operational test and evaluation
leading to the Milestone III Production and Deployment
decision, the Service Component updates the DCP to recommend
a commitment to production and deployment of the system
L13:7].
B. DSARC DECISION-MAKING REQUIREMENTS
A basic assumption of the researcher is that there is a
fundamental decision-making and management method by which
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major defense systems acquisition should be managed. In its
basic form, this method must contain elements and processes
by which the following objectives can be achieved:
1. Key Decision-Making at SECDEF Level
Exactly what constitutes a key decision has been
argued at length at all levels of the Defense Department
(53] [57] . Key decisions are few in number and must be of
sufficient importance as to warrant the consideration and
judgment of the Secretary. However, the Secretary must be
involved in the decision-making process frequently enough
to ensure that he has some measure of control over the pro-
gress of a program. Care must be taken to prevent the esca-
lation of decisions "to the top" on issues which can and
rightly should be made at a lower level within the Depart-
ment of Defense. Escalation of decisions normally comes
about either because individuals at a subordinate level are
not willing to accept the responsibility for their decisions
or because the top level manager (or his staff) is in doubt
as to the decision-making ability of subordinate managers.
In either case, the number of decisions placed before the
top level manager becomes greater and control becomes more
centralized.
Because of management layering at the OSD level,
strong centralized control within OSD has created many
management problems for the Services and their program mana-
gers. Examples of management problems include unnecessary
delays in documentation review and approval (thus stretching
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out the acquisition cycle) , an increased number of program
briefings and external influences from other offices outside
the control of the program office's chain of command [41:35-
36] .
In light of this, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
report stated the following:
Indeed, attempts to over centralize decision-making at
the top seriously impairs the Secretary's (SECDEF)
capability to exercise effective control. Under such
circumstances, far too many decisions go unmade, critical
issues are not addressed, problems are deferred and the
principle of personal accountability is lost in the
confused maze of 'staff coordination. 1 [46:21]
2
.
Specific Assignment of Responsibility
In any major defense system acquisition there are
almost countless tasks and functions that must be performed
properly and in a timely manner in order for the acquisition
to proceed. These tasks and functions must be identified
and responsibility for their accomplishment must be estab-
lished. When responsibility is initially assigned to an
office or organization, it falls upon that office or organi-
zation to specifically designate the individual (s) who will
be held accountable for the accomplishment of each task. By
simply holding the Service Component or OSD responsible, the
accountability is again lost in the "confused maze" of
staff coordination.
3. Proper Timing of Decisions
In order for the decisions made by the Secretary of
Defense to be effective and to provide him with the necessary
37

control over the acquisition of a new defense system, the
timing of his decisions is critical. If a decision is made
too early, it would be based upon incomplete and possibly
incorrect information which could result in erroneous conclu-
sions. Conversely, if a decision is made too late, there is
essentially no decision to be made. The alternatives are
limited to the extent that the decision becomes essentially
an approval of what is already being done. Therefore, the
point in time when the Secretary interacts in the acquisition
process is of vital importance. The variety of situations
encountered in individual acquisition programs precludes
basing these decision points on a fixed time basis. As key
decisions requiring Secretary of Defense action are defined,
the timing is predicated upon the reasons for the decisions
and what information must be available in order for the Secre-
tary to be able to make a sound decision.
Decision-making at levels below the Secretary of
Defense are equally important and must be approached in a
similar fashion. Identification of decision points, the
reasons for the decisions and the information necessary to
support the decision and who is responsible for the decision
must all be addressed so that decisions are made at the
proper time, neither too early nor too late.
4. Adequate Monitoring and Validation
The necessity of having certain key decisions made
at the Secretary of Defense level goes without question.
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Although the Secretary may delegate responsibility for the
development and production of a new defense system to a
Service Component, he retains full responsibility for pro-
viding adequate national defense. This responsibility mani-
fests itself in the decisions he must personally make. Also,
the Secretary's responsibility requires that he have a means
of monitoring program progress and for validation of Service
Component recommendations. Here too, care must be taken to
prevent the functions of monitoring and validation from be-
coming control and direction. In a bureaucracy the size of
the Defense Department, there is a tendency for those charged
with the task of monitoring or validating to become suffici-
ently powerful that they begin to control. This monitoring
and validation requirement is also applicable at levels below
the Secretary.
The process as espoused by Mr. Packard is simple in
concept and sound as a management philosophy. It provides
for key decisions to be made by the Secretary of Defense,
continues the use of the Development Concept Paper (DCP)
as the means by which issues and considerations which should
go before the Secretary for decision are pulled together
and agreement established between participants in a particu-
lar program, and uses the Defense System Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC) as the body for making recommendations to
the SECDEF [17:2]. Both the DCP and DSARC, when employed in
this context, support the Secretary and provide him with a
monitoring and validation capability while at the same time
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retaining the desirable features of having the Service Compo-
nent responsible for the development and procurement of
defense systems.
C. DCP/DSARC PROCESS
The above method for management and decision making is
essential to the DSARC process. Because the process is
basically the same for Milestone 0, I, II, and III in the
acquisition cycle, with the exception of the criteria being
used to evaluate the transition into the next phase, only
one description of the process will be presented.
To begin, the DOD component initiates the DCP process
with a request for a joint OSD/DOD component staff meeting.
For this meeting the DOD Component prepares a proposed DCP
outline. See Figure 2.
This requested meeting is scheduled through the Defense
Acquisition Executive (DAE) and is chaired by his representa-
tive. The meeting is also attended by representatives of the
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) members,
Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy USD (R&E) for
Test Evaluation and the Chairman of the Cost Analysis Improve-
ment Group (CAIG) in addition to the DOD Component Represen-
tative. Besides reviewing the DCP outline, this meeting sets
dates for the (Service) System Acquisition Review Council
C(S)SARC) and/or DSARC reviews, schedules events prior to the
reviews, identifies program alternatives, issues and formula-
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As a result of this meeting, based on the approved out-
line, the DOD Component prepares a "For Comment" draft DCP
which is then forwarded to the DAE for Coordination with the
OSD staff and the OJSC in conjunction with the DOD Component.
As a result of this coordination, the DAE takes the
necessary action to resolve program issues and identify
those that remain unresolved. The comments and the remain-
ing unresolved issues are used by the DOD Component to pre-
pare a second draft DCP which is then identified as the "For
Coordination" draft DCP.
This version is distributed by the DOD Component to the
DAE, (S)SARC and DSARC members, the Chairman of the JSC,
the DUSD (T&E) and the Chairman of the CAIG. After review
by the (S)SARC, the draft DCP is approved and a (S)SARC
report is prepared.
The draft DCP and (S)SARC report are then reviewed by
the Service Secretary and, if he is in agreement, approved
and forwarded to the DSARC.
While the Service Secretary is approving the (S)SARC
report and draft DCP, the Chairman of the CAIG provides the
CAIG's evaluation of the program cost estimates and the
DDCT&E) provides a T&E report to the DSARC members. Lastly,
the DAE advises the DOD Component Head and other DSARC
participants of any special presentation requirements for
the DSARC.
The DSARC review is then held and major issues discussed.
Following the completion of the DSARC review, the Chairman
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of the DSARC(DAE) has a report prepared consisting of the
DSARC recommendations and any dissenting positions including
a clear statement of the issues. The DAE also prepares a
proposed DCP action memorandum. This action memorandum is
coordinated by the DAE with the DSARC members, the Chairman
of the JCS, the DD(TSE) and the Chairman of the CAIG, with
a draft copy to the DOD Component Head for comment. After
this coordination, the proposed action memorandum is final-
ized by the DAE.
The DAE then forwards the draft DCP, the DSARC Report and
the proposed action memorandum to the SECDEF for a decision.
The SECDEF decision is consummated when he signs the DCP and
issues the action memorandum. After this, the DOD Component
Head has the necessary revisions made to the DCP, incorporates
the SECDEF directions and distributes the DCP, thus completiny
the DSARC/DCP decision and approval process for either Mile-
stone I, II, or III.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed briefly the events which take
place within the DSARC. It provides for key decisions to be
made by the SECDEF and DSARC documentation to support major
weapon systems. In Chapter IV the Budgeting process will be
discussed to identify how these acquisition requirements are
identified and related with resources.
43

IV. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING
A. INTRODUCTION
Mr. McNamara instituted several changes in the Department
of Defense which were received with mixed emotions by OSD
officials and members of DOD components. Among these changes
was the introduction of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting
System. This system was designed to provide the information
in a form desired and to integrate it into a single, coherent
management system. In the words of Mr. McNamara:
...this system serves several very important purposes:
1. It produces the annual Five-Year Defense Program
which is perhaps the most important single management
tool for the Secretary of Defense and the basis for
the annual proposal to the Congress.
2. It provides the mechanism through which financial
budgets, weapon programs, force requirements, military
strategy, and foreign policy objectives are all brought
into balance with one another.
3. It permits the top management of the Defense Depart-
ment, the President, and the Congress to focus their
attention on the tasks and missions related or our
national security objectives, rather than on the tasks
and missions of a particular service.
4. It provides for the entire Defense Establishment
a single "approved" plan projected far enough into the
future to ensure that all of the programs are both
physically and financially feasible [45:194].
The researcher would emphasize that while investigating
the philosophy and methodology of PPBS, one should not lose
sight of the basic meaning and purpose that the system
serves. The PPBS is a system for assisting choices related
to the use of resources. It does not make choices. It does
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not even reduce decisions to the selection of one clearly
correct course of action. It has the built-in objective of
expanding available alternatives. It does, however, have
the facility of providing the ingredients of choice and the
probable consequences of making alternatives extraordinarily
clear. Central to this process of illuminating choice is
the necessity for a program budget.
B. THE PPBS PROCESS
In the simplest view, the PPBS in the Defense Department
is an attempt to arrive at the most effective allocation of
resources to accomplish specific objectives in national
defense. The procedure is analogous to even the most rudi-
mentary budgeting process applied by any individual to his
own budget.
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in the
Department of Defense is the process through which the Secre-
tary of Defense administratively controls the military depart-
ments and defense agencies. It is through the PPBS that the
Secretary of Defense provides policy and guidance on force
levels, manpower and fiscal constraints, issues decisions
regarding program goals to support the forces, and budgets
annual funds to support the programs [22:2-6]. The main
products of the PPBS process are the Five-Year Defense Plan
(FYDP) and the annual budget. The FYDP is the official pro-
gram of the DOD; it summarizes the approved five-year pro-
grams of all military departments and defense agencies. It
is a viable plan which is updated three times a year as changes
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occur in accordance with the PPBS cycle. The FYDP projects
manpower and material requirements for five years and force
levels for eight years. The FYDP is fiscally oriented and
is not the vehicle through which the merits of new programs
are judged. It is primarily concerned with balancing all
approved programs within the financial constraints provided
by the Secretary of Defense. The different services provide
proposed revisions to the approved programs in the FYDP by
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) . Because of the
cyclic nature of the PPBS and the overlapping of the planning,
programming, and budgeting phases, it takes approximately
twenty-one months to get a new system into the budget.
Figure 3 illustrates the overlap in the PPBS phases for
any given fiscal year and points out the reason for the
twenty-one month delay in entering a new program into the
President's budget. Note that in any current fiscal year
there are three budget activities that take place [24:33].
First, the current fiscal year budget is being executed.
Second, the budget for the "budget year" (i.e., the current
fiscal year plus one) is reviewed at Service headquarters
and Secretary of Defense levels during the first quarter of
the current fiscal year and is submitted to the President
for inclusion in his budget in January. The President's
budget is then submitted to Congress for enactment for the
next fiscal year (i.e., the budget year). Third, during the
fiscal year, programming and shaping of the budget for the
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as indicated in Figure 3. Finally, planning is done for
the current year plus two and beyond. Indicated in Figure 3
is a time delay of twenty-one months from entering the
planning cycle until the President's budget is submitted to
Congress. It takes an additional eight months for Congress
to enact the budget. So in reality, the minimum time delay
in obtaining funds for a given program is about twenty-nine
months [24: 35] .
Considerable controversy surrounds the concept and effici-
ency of the PPBS. Although PPBS has been practiced in the
Department of Defense for more than seventeen years, it is
not as universally understood within the Department as one
might expect after such a long period of time. As a general
observation, it can be said that ASD(PA&E) is the DOD manager
of the Planning Phase of the PPBS, USD(R&E) for the Program-
ming Phase and ASD(C) for the Budgeting Phase for weapon sys-
tem acquisition.
According to Enthoven and Smith, a basic idea underlying
the rationale for the PPBS is that top decision makers give
explicit consideration to program alternatives [20:486],
The fact that USD(R&E) has become a major influence on the
weapon system acquisition process in recent years is not
generally contested. But, ASD(PA&E) still manages the plan-
ning cycle, including the PDM.
Even though ASD(PA&E) is the office primarily responsible
for the planning phase of the PPBS, the impact of this plan-
ning on Services budgets is limited. Studies and force
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planning trade-offs performed by ASD(PASE) are just one set
of many such plans developed by the Services, the Congress
and the OMB.
USD(RSE), unlike Congress and OMB and even ASD(PA&E),
reviews all service acquisition programs in detail. USD (R&E),
responsible primarily for programming DOD resources, is
intimately involved in all acquisition aspects of the PPBS
from the publication of the POM's through the issuance of
the PBDs.
The ASD(C), in this era of limited financial resources,
has temendous influence in his position as manager of the
budgeting phase of PPBS. ASD(C) , as the final staff arbiter
of what goes into the DOD portion of the President's Budget,
reviews most, if not all, acquisition programs in the service
budgets. Working closely with the Secretary of Defense, the
Comptroller signs the PBDs which yield the actual figures to
be included in the President's Budget. Even here, the USD
(R&E) is an active continuing participant and his advice on
a particular program is likely to be honored by the Comptroller.
Between the USD (R&E) and ASD(C), the needs and costs of DOD
weapon systems are genuinely considered together thus satis-
fying another of Enthoven and Smith's basic ideas underlying
the PPBS [20:486-487]
.
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 gave the SECDEF
the authority to make decisions pertaining to the planning,
programming and budgeting process. Under the National Security
Council, this legislation gave the SECDEF two distinct lines
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of authority. A direct line of command was established
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the unified and
specific commands. A line for administrative control of the
military departments and for management of support of mili-
tary forces was established through the Secretary of the
Military Departments. The SECDEF issues decisions regarding
threat appraisal strategy and force structure through the
command line of authority. He issues decisions regarding
programming of resources to support the force structure and
budgeting of annual funds to support programs through the
administrative line of authority.
The PPBS ' s organization and procedures involve the
following steps, the schedule for which is established each
year by the SECDEF.
The first phase of the PPBS, planning, sets the pattern
for the entire process. Planning starts with the assess-
ment of the threat to the security of the United States and
culminates with the projection of force objectives to assure
the security of the United States. For the FY81 Fiscal
Cycle, this phase began in May 1977 and ended in March 1979.
See Figure 4.
This planning phase began in May 1977 with issuance of
the Joint Service Planning Document (JSPD) by the OJCS.
This document has two basic parts: (1) Part I—Objectives,
and (2) Part II—Needs these forces require to meet the ob-
jectives. From the JSPD, the SECDEF then issues his strategy






























































































the November timeframe, the CG is provided to the DOD compo-
nents and JCS for comment in event there are major differences
in military objectives or in threat appraisal. In December
1978, OSD reviews the suggestions and alters the CG where
applicable and resubmits the CG again to the DOD components
and JCS for comment. Upon return of the CG, OSD prepares
the final version of the CG, which occurs in the late Febru-
ary 1979-early March 1979 timeframe, and forwards it to the
President for his review. This step completes the Planning
Phase.
The next phase, the programming phase, is to translate
the approved concepts and objectives, prepared during the
planning phase, into a definitive structure expressed in
terms of time-phased resource requirements including manpower,
monies, and material. •
In March, after the President has reviewed the CG, the
DOD components are asked to prepare and submit the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) to OSD. The POM will describe
and justify each program regarding manpower, monies, and
material. The POM is forwarded to OSD in May 1979 for the
FY81 Budget. After review by OSD, some programs are elimi-
nated while others undergo schedule and funding alterations.
Because of these modifications, the DOD components are given
the opportunity to reclama through issue papers. In June
1979, the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) is
drafted by the OJCS and forwarded to OSD. As a result of
the POM, issue papers and the JPAM, OSD drafts and prepares
a tentative Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) for each
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program for review and comment by the OJCS and the DOD compo-
nents. The review comments are appraised by OSD, following
which, each PDM is forwarded to the SECDEF for final approval.
Once the PDM has been completed, the DOD components prepare
and forward Decision Package Sets (DPS) for their programs to
OSD for inclusion in the budget. After OSD has commented on
the DPS, a final version is prepared. This completes the
programming phase.
The budgeting phase is the final effort of the PPBS. The
annual budget expresses the financial requirements necessary
to support the approved forces and programs. It generally
begins in the September to October timeframe, one year prior
to Budget year approval.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides SECDEF
with budget guidance based on the President's budget policy.
In turn, the SECDEF establishes his budget policy and issues
guidance to the DOD components in August. The DOD components
then have until October to submit their Budget Estimates to
OSD.
Following this submittal and analysis by OSD, a series
of Budget Hearings are held, attended by the SECDEF and
various DOD component heads, for resolution of problem areas.
OMB representatives usually participate in these hearings.
Based on the submittal of Budget Estimates and the Budget
Hearings, the SECDEF issues a series of Program Budget
Decisions (PBDs) in late October. Between October and
December, the OJCS and the DOD components have an opportunity
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to comment on the PBDs after which SECDEF issues revised
PBDs, as necessary. Any unresolved budget items remaining
at this time are discussed in joint meetings between the
SECDEF, OJCS and DOD Component Heads. The SECDEF then makes
final decisions and submits his proposed DOD Budget to OMB.
This action completes the budgeting phase.
Of the many innovations introduced into the field of
management science in recent years, none have been more con-
troversial than the PPBS developed by Robert McNamara for
the DOD in 1961. The utility and worth of the PPBS are still
sharply debated today. There is considerable disagreement
among those who have studied the PPBS as to what is is inten-
ded to accomplish and what it actually has done during its
eighteen years of existence.
The recent establishment of the Defense Resource Board
as recommended by the Defense Resources Management Study
was a step taken to try to improve the decisions within the
PPBS process and insure an interface of the decisions in the
acquisition process and the resources available to support
these decisions. The DRB would also provide organizational
interface. The DRB is made up of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense (Chairman) and four other members: The USD(RSE)
,
the ASDCPA&E), the ADS (C) , and the ASD(MRASL) [41:ix]. The
actual accomplishments of the DRB are questionable at this
time because of the infancy of the Board. The first product





The system acquisition process is intimately associated
with the PPBS. In the DOD, as elsewhere, programs cannot
be considered in their proper perspective without considering
at the same time the PPB system. Similarly, the PPBS s is
incomplete without consideration for the acquisition of sys-
tems needed by the DOD to accomplish its mission requirements.
In order to fully understand this truism, one merely has
to recall that the PPBS comprises the various aspects of a
system (i.e., it includes planning, and programming documents)
that permit the establishment, maintenance and revision of
the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) and the DOD budget. The
FYDP itself, is the the official DOD document which summarizes
the plans into tangible programs (and associated budgets)
approved by the Secretary of Defense. As a result, a change
in program content in the acquisition of a system, a change
in the FYDP, or a change in the Budget all affect each other.
The importance of the interrelationship and how the acqui-
sition and PPBS process impact each other will be discussed
in Chapter V. One of the key factors in the procurement of
a major weapon system is that this interface and relationship
is properly established and maintained throughout the Life
Cycle of a program.
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V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PPBS
AND THE DSARC PROCESSES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes how the DSARC process is related
to the PPBS process. While some of the material is duplica-
tive of that presented in previous chapters, the entire pro-
cess is illustrated here to show the effect of one process
upon the other.
B. THE BUDGET PROCESS
In the budgetary process, funds requested are reviewed
and authorized annually accordiny to the functional activi-
ties involved, i.e., personnel operations, maintenance, etc.
In the programming system, funds needed are forecasted for
the current year and five years ahead, according to the
missions the funds support.
The approved budget becomes the financial plan for the
DOD during the fiscal year. Most budget authority, and other
budget resources, are made available by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) under an apportionment system that
assures the effective and orderly use of authorized funds.
The Congressional Reform Act of 1974 requires the Execu-
tive agencies to submit their budget request in mission-
oriented terms beginnin with Fiscal Year 1979. The proce-
dures spelled out by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 were to give Congress a chance to weight
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the relative merits of various programs and to cut those pro-
grams that it finds ineffective.
The PPBS process is considered to be the rational approach




Department of Defense management decisions regarding pro-
gram initiation, restructuring, and continuation must be vali-
dated or confirmed in two separate arenas: the acquisition
milestone review process (DSARC) and the planning, programming,
and budgeting process (PPBS) . As with any dynamic organiza-
tion, DOD receives inputs of resources and returns products
and services as an output. The monetary allocation function
is accomplished by the PPBS process and is separate from the
expenditure function which is monitored and guided by the
program acquisition review process. In order for a program
to continue through its acquisition cycle without major set-
backs or interruptions, it must be supported with compatible
decisions in both processes. As stated in DOD 5000.1,
Secretary of Defense Milestone decisions to initiate
system acquisitions or to redirect the program do not
authorize the commitment of funds. Appropriate action
will be taken to reflect the decision in the PPBS
documentation for budget approval and funding [13:2].
During each major phase of the DSARC process, OSD will approve
PPBS documentation for budget approval and funding for DOD.
The PPBS reviews determine the requirements which are
included in the DOD budget request which is forwarded to
Congress. During PPBS budget review, a program is challenged
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as to its necessity and validity as part of the total DOD
program, and as to its priority among other requirements in
the DOD. In contrast to this, during the acquisition review
process, decisions focus on the merits of the program itself,
and not on its position as part of a total service structure.
Because of the requirement for continuous coordination
and the fact that milestone review decisions do not always
occur with their related FPBS decisions, a requirement exists
for a strong and calculated interface between the two processes
In the following sections the researcher will present the vari-
ous aspects of this interface.
D. INTERFACE VIEWED FROM THE DSARC PROCESS
The DSARC process addresses issues related to the progress
of individual defense system programs, and ensure timely
SECDEF review. This review is related to the individual pro-
gram schedule rather than the PPBS schedule and is usually
much longer
.
It is possible for two or more POM reviews to occur in
the PPBS process in the same time that it takes a program to
move from one milestone to the next in the DSARC process.
This is shown in Figure 5. Therefore, it is generally
accepted that the DSARC process is a long-term plan and the
PPBS POM operates on a short-term (yearly) basis. Because
of this, DSARC decision documents (MENS, DCP, etc.) became
a part of an important interface relating various decisions



































































As depicted in Figure 5, the DSARC and PPBS processes
are linked by the DSARC decision documents at the time of
program initiation and major milestone reviews. The MENS
is one key interface which has been established because of
the importance and emphasis on "front-end" planning. This
has resulted from two things. First, there must be a mission
to justify the need. Secondly, the MENS serves as a budget
justification document unique to major weapon systems,
supplementing the normal POM and budget submissions [55]
.
It is anticipated that in the future, the MENS will serve as
a signal to the budgeting process to expect funding require-
ments for a new program.
The MENS is prepared for all Acquisition Category (ACAT)
I and selected ACAT II programs. However, the DOD is attempting
to utilize a "mini" MENS in the same function for ACAT II-IV
programs. With the ACAT II through ACAT IV programs, program
element numbers are assigned after initiation approval and
a funding line item is established in the budget. For ACAT I
programs (and selected ACAT II programs) , the review is more
detailed and the budgeting process is more involved.
The DCP augments the PPBS by addressing issues related to
the progress of individual defense system programs. It is
the document that records the SECDEF decisions pertaining to
an ongoing program. Depending upon when the DCP related
decisions are made will generally determine how the decisions
will be reflected into the PPBS process and the means by
which it will be accomplished (e.g., whether it will be
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reflected in the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) , the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM), Issue Papers, or Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM) process)
.
To ensure that the review and decision processes are
complementary, a program manager, working through a program
sponsor in DOD, should attempt to schedule DSARC reviews so
that decisions resulting therefrom can be incorporated into
the yearly POM cycle. The program sponsor is responsible for
insuring that SECDEF decisions made during the DSARC process
are fully funded during the POM process by working closely
with the resource sponsor, and that funding levels are in
conformance with decisions previously made [22:30].
Program milestone decisions which are not synchronized
with the POM cycle (as depicted as MS II of Figure 5) and
which require changes to the FYDP must be accomplished by
means of a Program Change Request (PCR) . Generally, in this
event, funds must be reporgrammed within the Service Component.
If the program does not have sufficient priority to warrant
such reprogramming, the Service Component has the risk of pro-
gram delay for at least one year.
The DSARC documentation is an important interface for the
transfer of information from the DSARC process to the PPBS
process. In the next section, the interface from the PPBS
and its effects on the DSARC process will be presented.
E. INTERFACE VIEWED FROM THE PPBS PROCESS
The PPBS becomes important to the DSARC process during the
annual FOM cycle. The POM, therefore, is another key interface
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because each POM is used by SECDEF to propose programs and
solutions to satisfy the need and strategies developed during
the planning phase. Resource requirements for a new program
are entered into the programming and budgeting portion of
PPBS by means of the POM. Even though such a recommended
"new start" does not become an approved SECDEF program by
this process, it is still necessary to "line up" funds prior
to SECDEF approval, because of the twenty-nine month delay
between planning and budgeting built into the PPBS process
[24:35]. The annual POM submission is basically a modifica-
tion of the previous year's submission, updated to reflect
new programs, changes in existing programs, and current
guidance from OSD.
A key point here is that even though SECDEF decisions
during the DSARC process do not authorize funding, approved
changes by the SECDEF to a program and budget decision
process of the PPBS constitute budget approval and funding.
These changes are to be incorporated into the DCP within
thirty days of such a decision [5:10] [15:5].
From another stand point, the decisions made by the SECDEF
during the DSARC process must be reflected in the Five-Year
Defense Plan (FYDP) . This should be accomplished through the
Program Objective Memorandum/Program Decision Memorandum
process depending upon where in the DSARC process the related
decisions were made [41:17].
The requirement for interface between the two processes
is a valid one. In the PPBS, the need for close coordination




As discussed in Chapters III and IV, the principal
reviewers and decision-makers in both processes are the same.
Because of this fact, decisions that are made in one of the
processes should be easily developed and supported in the
other process. Within the offices of these principal decision-
makers, decisions and documentation should flow smoothly be-
cause the necessary program background has already been
established by one of the process reviews.
The Defense Resources Management Study (DRMS) recognized
this requirement and recommended the establishment of a
Defense Resources Board (DRB) to manage the combined program/
budget review. The Board would ensure a collaborative review
of service program/budget submissions by the OSD officials
most directly responsible. The Board could conduct work
sessions without the Chairman having to be present. The ASD
(PA&E) or the ASD(C) would preside depending on the subject
[41:22]
.
This is a key interface because opinions, support and
office guidance are developed early in the program which helps
determine if the program will survive.
G. SUMMARY
In this chapter the requirement for a relationship between
the DSARC and PPBS processes was discussed. Between the two
processes there is a gray area of mutual interface. The
Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Review Committee CNMARC) recog-
nized the potential disruption to Navy programs and objectives
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which could be caused by conflicting decisions in the two
processes and cautioned that, "overall goals must be well-
defined in relation to OSD guidance and projected resources
in order that OSD top level commitment can be secured simi-
larly through the DSARC and PPBS process." [34:37] The
study also noted that decisions are not automatically coordi-
nated between them, particularly in the area of supporting
documentation
.
In the next chapter, the problems relating to the inter-
face between the two processes will be presented.
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VI. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INTERFACE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will address the problems associated with
the DSARC/PPBS interface. In developing the analysis in
this chapter, the researcher has incorporated points surfaced
during discussions held with OSD and Navy representatives as
well as papers, statements, memos, etc., furnished by the





1. Requirement for More Staff Clarity in Staff
Responsibilities
Interviewees noted that the implementation of DCDD
5000.1 has been marked by a trend toward more and more OSD
staff involvement in the management of various aspects of
on-going major acquisition programs. Also, DODD 5000.2 tends
to encourage the OSD staff groups toward this undue involve-
ment at ever-increasing levels of detail. Moreover, claimed
several interviewees, the existence of a DSARC program
management process alongside, but independent of, the PPBS
resource allocation process has caused the overall organiza-
tional design within OSD to become pluralistic and redundant.
There is a requirement to clarify the OSD functional
staff responsibilities as distinct from responsibilities of
the DSARC principals. Acquisition managers and key personnel
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involved in weapon systems acquisition were unanimous in
noting that staff "layering," wherein each staff element or
layer in OSD had almost autonomous power in its assigned
functional area, was a major irritant to effective acquisi-
tion management. It was observed that there are too many
personnel at the OSD level involved in the two processes,
thereby resulting in a widespread decoupling between the
decisions resulting from the two processes.
Because some staff members feel the reduction of
decision-making power, they tend to push more than what is
necessary up the chain for approval. This in turn creates
centralization at the top of the system. This is exemplified
in the DSARC process at DSARC I, where each candidate system
is examined without regard to competing users for DOD funds.
The "budgeting manager," ASD(C), sits in the DSARC meetings
and through the lack of procedural or political control over
decisions permits a program to proceed without regard to
available funding [57]
.
Underlying this basic problem of raising the level of
decision-making within the organizational activities is the
influence of the political environment. Even though the
acquisition process itself is uniquely designed and intended
to be relatively insensitive to the flow of political prob-
lems which surround it, there has been an increasing tendency
for political influence in the decision-making process [57]
.
It was pointed out in the Task Force Study that part
of the organizational design problem in recent years has been
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a political structure which has created several managerial
problems. Primarily as a result of changes in personnel and
viewpoints within DOD, the Congress, the Executive Branch
external to DOD, and in the public sector, there are frequent
shifts in the perceptions of priorities, alternatives, and
appreciation of the external threat which caused the program
to be approved for development in the first place. Such
changes often result in major redirection of the program, with
attendant increases in overall cost and significant delays in
the schedule [38:60].
From discussions with OSD officials, the natural
reaction to these redirections is to assume that the troubles
arise from inadequate preliminary study and program definition.
This in turn causes more and earlier reviews of programs. The
earlier and more frequent reviews make it hard to properly
plan a program because of the lack of necessary data to
support the decision-making process. The decision-making
process is then caught up in a vicious cycle [56] [57]
.
2. Inconsistencies Within the Organizational Guidelines
and the Processes Themselves
a. There Is An Increasing Amount of Time
Associated with the DSARC Process.
Interviewees noted that there has been an ever-
increasing amount of time associated with phases of the DSARC
process which impact directly on schedule and cost growth.
There has been nearly a three fold lengthening of the "front-
end" process (time to reach DSARC II) . It has become impossible
67

to follow the progress of decision commitments envisioned
in the DSARC process and relate them to the appropriate
phases of the PPBS process. It has also become difficult
to prevent decisions from being reversed over those in the
initial DSARC review of a program because the present avail-
ability of PPBS channels makes it possible to sidestep DSARC
decisions [38:38].
b. The PPBS Process Has Never Had An Explicit
Management System for Tracking Progress Made
in Implementing Approved Programs.
Program decisions are generally based on compari-
sons of estimated capabilities associated with alternative
resource allocations. Analysis supporting such decision
processes incorporates explicit management goals, scenarios,
and support assumptions. In this case, fiscal accounting,
oriented to fiduciary responsibilities, does not provide
adequate measures of program execution. The system lacks
some means to make adjustments for past decisions [38:34],
A good example of this is that decisions are
presently being made which will affect next year's budget
and subsequent year's funding. Interviewees claimed that
these decisions could be ignored during the next year's
budget review. The process has the problem of repeated
yearly approvals, with little regard for the decisions made





As noted in the DRMS Final Report , there exists
a difference between the fiscal guidance or the level of
resources needed to carry out "approved" programs, and the
actual funding levels that occur in the budget [41:6]. For
example, the FY 1979 budget total was $10 billion lower than
the fiscal guidance for FY 1979 provided a few months earlier.
In other years, the "approved" program has contained deferrals
from prior years and other choices which, all together, total
much more than the DOD budget is likely to be. This creates
fiscal gaps. Such fiscal gaps defer the hard decisions
beyond the programming phase to budget time , and set up
pressures to unbalance the program as a way of coping with
budget "cuts" in the final stages of budget review, effec-
tively wasting much of the previous discussions [41:7].
c. There Exists Inflexibility Within Both the
DSARC and PPBS Processes.
A manifestitation of DSARC/PPBS process inflexi-
bility is the situation where initial program requirements
and specifications are viewed as sacred and unalterable.
This occurs even though, as the acquisition program progresses,
there are almost always opportunities for revising and refining
the initial performance criteria in order to achieve reductions
in cost or schedule, or even optimization of performance in
the final end product. The Task Force Study emphasized the
need for a flexible environment, in order for the design to
evolve in the most cost effective manner, rather than being




There is also a need for greater flexibility in
the application of established acquisition program review
and approval activities such as the DSARC process itself.
Adherence to the formally prescribed DSARC Milestones (I, II,
and III) for every acquisition program is counterproductive
[38:4]. It should be noted that A-109, while clearly
defining and describing these individual milestones, does
not indicate that they cannot be combined or eliminated to
fit the needs of each particular program. It was noted in
the Task Force 77 Study that based on prior practice, it
seems highly likely that the tendency is to require strict
adherence to each of these major decision points "because
they are called out in A-109." [38:42]
In the case of conventional Navy ships with state-of-the-
art subsystems, for example, the lead ship could be
subject to a single combined DSARC for Milestone I, and
II while the following ships could be subject to only a
Milestone III review point. In the case of Naval ships
with major advanced subsystems, the combat system and
the ship could be subjected to a combined Milestone
and Milestone I review in which the major emphasis is
on the MENS for the combat system, while the entire ship
weapon system combined would be examined together at
Milestone II and III. Unconventional ships would be
subject to the comolete MENS approval and DSARC review
process at each of the four milestones as prescribed
by A-109 [5:22]
.
This illustrates the possibility for a spectrum
of applicability of the A-109 review/decision milestones
which would permit the basic policy to be more flexible in
order to meet the needs of each individual program in both
the PPBS and the DSARC processes.
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d. Insufficient Recognition is Given to
Coordination Between the Two Processes in
the Area of Funds Availability.
Funds availability is very sensitive in its poten-
tial impact on both processes in the political, financial
and technical areas. As previously discussed, the planning,
programming and budgeting system functions independently of
the DSARC process
.
Under current acquisition policies and practices,
there is insufficient recognition given to the probable impact
of program risks in the development of funding estimates and
program budgets. There is insufficient flexibility to permit
program modifications needed to meet threat uncertainties, or
even to solve the technical problems which most assuredly
occur in every program. At the present time the program mana-
ger must commit to execute a task for a relatively precise
amount of funds some two to three years before the task itself
is to be undertaken.
The current reprogramming authority is inadequate
to meet the needs of current programs, having been established
many years ago when the value of the dollar was greater than
at present. The reprogramming limit of $2 million for R&D
and $5 million for production simply cannot be responsive for
effective management of today's acquisition programs [47] [55].
Although it is expected to be very difficult to accomplish,
it appears what is needed is Congressional authorization of
revised limits on reprogramming authority to reflect the
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current dollar equivalent of the $2 and $5 million limits
which were established more than ten years ago [55]
.
Further, additional budget flexibility is needed
to permit the immediate follow-up of a Milestone program
start with studies necessary to support the Alternative
Concept Exploration phase. When a MENS is approved, action
in the form of resolving the issues and defining a program
within a year is obviously necessary. However, a major pro-
gram decision is usually accompanied by a budget change
which is not effective for at least one year and might not
be effective for as long as two years. As stated in Chapter
IV, this is due to delays in the PPBS process and the point
at which a system enters the process.
e. Inconsistencies Within the Organizational
Guidelines and the Process Itself Result in
Other Inefficiencies in Budgeting.
An example of this is the allocation of resources
to a program. That is, each year in the POM cycle and on the
established FYDP, a program is given a program element number
and funding is allocated to this program in a horizontal manner
(i.e., Research and Development, Production, Military Construc-
tion, Operation and Maintenance, etc.). These different cate-
gories of funding are apportioned between several programs
vertically. CSee Figure 6.) In most programs where repro-
gramming is necessary, there is no movement of funds horizon-
tally between funding categories due to appropriation







































reprogamming is required. For example, if program A's R&D
resources in Figure 6 were cut and the program could not
perform efficiently with the amount of funding remaining in
the budget, the natural tendency would be to "borrow" funding
from programs B and C even though there was excess money
within program A in other funding categories (i.e., Produc-
tion, O&M, etc.). If the resources are available to be
"borrowed" from programs B and C, this approach can be used,
but if not, the system does not work. In any event, the
interface to reflect this reprogramming readily into any of
the programs is not there, and funding which appears to be
available in the PPBS process may have already been committed.
On the other hand, if program A takes a cut in R&D or Produc-
tion funding and funds cannot be provided to meet the planned
schedule, consideration should be given to reducing the other
areas of funding (i.e., MILCON, O&M, etc.) or even cancella-
tion of the program. This relationship between the programs
and apportionment is critical. Interviewees state that the
appropriate approach is to review both processes at the same
time.
f. The Lack of Program Cancellation As A Viable
Alternative Has Caused the Problem of Program
Stretch Outs.
This problem has evolved as a result of the in-
creased requirement for resources to get new programs funded
which have been approved in the DSARC process. An example is
the F-15 program where the production rate was dropped below
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that which was efficient for the contractor to maintain in
order that other Defense programs could be both established
and continued [53] . In this area a lack of interface between
the short-range POM cycle of the PPBS process and the long-
range plan in the DSARC process exists. This has created a
need for some method to incorporate long-range thinking and
affordability considerations into the PPBS process together
with a viable tool to manage it.
The data assembled by the Task Force Study, in
1977, provides an interesting insight into the relationships
between the length of a program and the probability that the
program may be cancelled at any point during its typical
8-10 year development cycle. Figure 7 summarizes the data
on a large sample of programs (114) and illustrates the rela-
tively high probability that a given undertaking will be can-
celled before producing a combat-useful product, particularly
if the Full-Scale Engineering Development phase extends beyond
five years in length. The dip in the annual probability of
cancellation which occurs at about three and one-half years
after start of Full-Scale Engineering Development reflects
the availability of initial test data, which has a tendency
to support FSED. As the test and development effort continues
beyond five years, problems of a technical, schedule, and
financial nature tend to come up, leading to growing disen-
chantment with the project and an increasing probability that




























The DRMS Final Report addressed another conse-
quence of neglect for cancellation considerations in that
some issues do not get enough attention. One such issue is
the availability of adequate funding for the program being
reviewed and approved. Programs are approved for Full-Scale
Engineering Development and Production when the funds avail-
able for tnose activities are known to be inadequate. The
usual result is insufficient initial funding, followed
inevitably by schedule slippage and eventually, increased
program costs [49] [53]
.
The Acquisition Advisory Group (AAG) report also
noted this problem of internal management control (or lack
of success) of major weapon system programs. It was noted
that there was an apparent lack of coordination among the
processes which resulted in program instability for some
major weapon systems [1:25].
It was also noted by AAG that there had been a
number of complaints by the Services that the PPBS process
had often resulted in decisions contrary to DSARC decisions
which had several adverse effects on major programs. It was
claimed that such decisions were made without proper consider-
ation of program impact. The OSD Comptroller then pointed
out that DSARC decisions cannot be either final or binding
without regard to available financial resources. The AAG
agreed that in each budget cycle, it may be necessary to
reallocate financial resources and that this may need to be




g. There Exists A Common Threat Relating to
Program Advocates and Advocacy.
It was clear that development programs which lacked
strong advocacy were much more likely to be cancelled than
those which had energetic and dedicated advocates. The Condor
program is a typical example of an effort which ultimately
was cancelled because the program simply lacked strong advo-
cates for the particular operational capability which it was
intended to provide [38:42]. In a more recent case, the B-l
program, which had clear cut advocacy for much of its life,
eventually lost the most influential of its advocates in the
Executive Branch following the change of administration and was
cancelled by Presidential order.
On the other hand, there are numerous examples of
programs which appear to be continually in trouble for one
reason or another (e.g., F-14 and F-16) which are carried on
year after year because they have the support of active and
vocal advocates, either in the Sponsoring Service, in OSD, in
the Congress, or elsewhere. It seems clear, without advocacy,
the chances of a program proceeding through its complete acqui-
sition cycle into production and deployment are significantly
diminished, while with strong advocates, certain programs may
be continued in existence long after they should have been
terminated for technical problems, inadequate capability, cost
or schedule overruns, or similar reasons.
The Task Force Report indicates program advocacy
may be either good or bad in terms of system acquisition. It
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is often a necessary ingredient if a program is to be con-
tinued through to completion, and a lack of advocates can
spell serious danger even to a "good" program. In other
cases, strong advocacy may result in the continuation of
programs which would otherwise be terminated. Such advocacy
covers the entire range of possibilities: It may be politi-
cal, it may be mission-oriented, it may be extremely parochial,




There have been several persistent problems in the acqui-
sition of major weapon systems with no apparent solution in
sight, even with the numerous efforts to bring about change.
Existing DOD directives and instructions do recognize the
need for insuring review by the SECDEF whenever recommenda-
tions emanating from the PPBS process are not compatible with
DSARC decisions. The DSARC process is basically sound, but
sometimes lacks adequate evaluation of initial cost estimates,
life cycle costs, development alternatives and prototype




VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. There is a lack of a coordinated interface between
the DSARC and PPBS processes. The interface require-
ments exist but both systems function independently
of each other .
The documentation in both processes discussed in
Chapters V and VI are presently being used inefficiently
because there is no policy guidance on exactly how they will
be incorporated in the different processes. Also, because
of timing, the phasing differences of the two processes
makes the use of these documents ineffective. In order for
the two processes to function smoothly and efficiently, effec-
tive interface is absolutely necessary.
2
.
There is a lack of uniform implementation of decisions
between one process and the other .
This is partially reflected in the first conclusion.
Because of funding resources during the DSARC, either a con-
solidated review for both processes or reduced time interval
between the processes is required. This problem was discussed
in Chapter VI and supported by the DRMS Final Report .
3. Political conflict is inherent in both processes .
When advocacy is used properly, it enhances the
interface and decision flow readily from one process
to the other insuring appropriate survivability .
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A key to program survivability is to insure major
decision-makers support the program. This aids the consis-
tency of the decisions made in both processes. Presently
because of political conflicts or lack of advocacy, there is
an undercurrent within DOD that can seriously hamper a pro-
gram's survivability. If the support is not attained early,
the program can be delayed or cancelled.
4 . The phasing of the two processes is critically
hampered because the time between Milestones in
the DSARC process is increasing.
This increased timing between milestones sometimes
causes programs to miss the yearly POM "window," further
causing unnecessary delay in the program. This additional
time reduces the "timeliness" of the existing documentation
interfaces in that once the decisions of these documents
are implemented into the other process the decisions
supporting them may have to change.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Determine a way to insure coordinating and inte-
gration of the processes .
The fact that integration of the two processes is
needed was highlighted in Chapter VI and supported by three
recent studies (Task Force, AAG, DRMS)
.
Because DSARC decisions are not funding decisions,
it is recommended that a review be made and corrective action
taken to insure better coordination and integration of OSD
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management control systems (PPBS, DCP , MENS, etc.) that inter-
act with the DSARC process and related Service processes.
Decisions recommended as a result of any OSD management
process should be flagged and addressed to SECDEF, the DSARC
principals and the head of the affected DOD component prior
to final approval by the SECDEF.
There are two approaches that may be useful in streng-
thening the interface between the DSARC process and the PPBS
process. First, as soon as a weapon system enters the DSARC
process (that is, approval of the MENS at Milestone 0) , it
should be documented in the PPBS process as a claimant
against the "planning wedge" of uncommitted resources poten-
tially available to the defense budget in future years. How
this planning wedge would relate to the FYDP is a matter of
critical importance to the PPBS process. This is an area
for future study or a follow-on thesis.
Secondly, would be to further strengthen both DSARC
and the PPBS procedurally. In order to be considered in the
PPBS, the Secretary may require that system acquisitions be
in compliance with the process requirements of A-109. In
fact, this notion has been tested at the insistence of OMB
during the fiscal 1980 budget review, but its effects are not
clear. It also may be possible to establish a reverse inter-
face in which acquisitions facing DSARC decisions could not




The DRB, if properly administered, could help imple-
ment the above two approaches. The Board would bridge
jurisdictional differences in OSD and offer greater contin-
uity and institutional memory to the PPBS process.
However, the DRB as presently established is counterproduc-
tive because of political conflicts within OSD. This is
because ASD(PA&E) or ASD(C) presentlv preside over the DRB
which is within the PPBS process only; hence there is no
continuity of decisions within the PPBS and DSARC processes
when ASD(PASE) and ASD(C) are not in agreement with DSARC
decisions [41:20].
2. There should be early involvement of principals
in the DSARC and PPBS processes .
Chapter VI discussed how advocates aid the consis-
tency of the decisions made in both processes. It is there-
fore recommended that a concentrated effort be made by the
program manager and program sponsor to gain as much support
as possible early in program initiation. A key means to
accomplish this occurs after Milestone of the DSARC process.
Once the program manager has developed the acquisition strategy
for his program, he should then brief the acquisition strategy
to the individual DSARC principals. This would give the
principals an indication early in the program what the weapon
system is about as well as an indication of how it is going
to be accomplished without the details of a DSARC review.
Another key means of involving the principals and staff of





Insure decisions are reflected from one process to
the other as soon as possible .
Because the DSARC and PPBS processes are parallel but
independent of each other, not all decisions are transmitted
from one process to the other readily. As noted earlier,
this causes delays, slippage and the reversal of decisions.
There has to be coordination of the DSARC decisions (especially
II and III) with programming and budgeting decisions in the
PPBS process.
This could be accomplished by coordinating some, but
not all DSARC II and III decisions with the schedule of the
PPBS programming and budgeting cycle. Thus the SECDEF would
schedule decisions for major systems so that a decision is
registered in both processes at once. It might be possible,
for example, to compress the PPBS proyram and budget reviews
into single major issue review periods, in which DSARC II
and III decisions were also scheduled. How this might be
done is a matter of detailed architecture of the PPBS, but
the principle would reduce unnecessary redundancy in DOD
decision-making and strengthen the enforcement of both the
DSARC and PPBS decisions.
4 Conduct a review of the "old way" of thinking .
It has been documented that interface between the two
processes is necessary for a number of reasons. Still there
seems to be a lack of adequate interface because the two sys-
tems operate independently. It is recommended that in reviewing
the processes for improved interface, further consideration be
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given to the possible consolidation of the processes to permit
concurrent review of a program. This would enable decision-
makers to better understand the program and allocate resources
for funding more efficiently. In order to accomplish this,
a "window" would have to be established where each existing
and potential program would be presented for particular prob-
lems, funding profiles, schedules, etc. for review and approval
prior to the POM "window." This would also occur after the
consolidated guidance was forwarded to the Service Secretaries
insuring the programs submitted for approval were in fact





AGENCY - A department, commission, board or independent
office in the executive branch of the government.
APPORTIONMENT - A cut of an appropriation given to a depart-
ment by the Office of Management and Budget. This cut
may be all or only part of the dollars appropriated.
An apportionment is an allocation at department level
and represents the amount that can be committed or
obligated, regardless of the amounts shown in the
appropriation or financial plan.
APPROPRIATION - A fund authorization set up by an Act of
Congress which permits a department or other governmental
agency to obligate the U. S. Government to pay money for
goods or services.
APPROVED PROGRAM - Resources (Forces, Manpower, Obligational
Authority and Material) for individual program elements
reflected in the FYDP , as modified by the Secretary of
Defense decisions.
AUTHORIZATION ACT - An Act giving authority to buy certain
things when the appropriations are made available by
Congress.
BUDGET - A planned program for a fiscal period in terms of
estimated costs, obligations and expenditures.
BUDGET CYCLE - The period of time necessary to formulate,
review, present and secure approval of the Fiscal Program
for a specific ensuing period of time.
DECISION COORDINATING PAPER (DCP) - A document prepared by
the procuring activity and coordinated with key DOD
officials providing a summary management document for
the Secretary of Defense. DCP reflects the Secretary
of Defense decisions on important development and
engineering modification programs. The document serves
as a source of primary information and rationale and
for updating the FYDP.
FISCAL GUIDANCE - Annual guidance issued by the Secretary of
Defense which provides the fiscal constraints that must
be observed by the JCS, the Military Departments, and
Defense Agencies, in the formulation of force structures
and Five-Year Defense Program, and by the Secretary of
Defense Staff in reviewing proposed programs.
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FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM (FYDP) - The official program
which summarizes the Secretary of Defense approved
plans and programs for the Department of Defense.
The FYDP is published at least annually. The FYDP
is also represented by a computer data base which is
updated regularly to reflect decisions.
PROGRAM ELEMENT - A description of a mission by the identifi-
cation of the organizational entities and resources
needed to perform the assigned mission. Resources
consist of forces, manpower, material quantities and
cost, as applicable. The program element is the basic
building block of the FYDP.
ACAT - Acquisition Category
—
programs are divided into four
Acquisition Categories (ACATs) to facilitate effective
management and review. A specific level of decision
authority and specific acquisition procedures and
responsibilities are assigned for each category.
MISSION NEED - A required capability within an agency's
overall purpose, including cost and schedule considerations
PROGRAM - Means an organized set of activities directed
toward a common purpose, objective, or goal undertaken
or proposed by an agency in order to carry our responsi-
bilities assigned to it.
MAJOR SYSTEM - Means that combination of elements that will
function together to produce the capabilities required
to fulfill a mission need. The elements may include,
for example, hardware, equipment, software, construction,
or other improvements or real property.
SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS - Means the sequence of acquisi-
tion activities starting from the agency's reconciliation
of its mission needs, with its capabilities, priorities
and resources, and extenting through the introduction
of a system into operational use of the otherwise success-
ful achievement of program objectives.
LIFE CYCLE COST - Means the sum total of the direct, indirect,
recurring, nonrecurring, and other related costs incurred,
or estimated to be incurred, in the design, development,
production, operation, maintenance and support of a
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18. OMB Office, Management and Budget
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22. PDM Program Decision Memorandum
23. POM Program Objective Memorandum
24. PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
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A. Directed to DOD Level interviewees:
1. What do you consider to be the key interface points
between the DSARC and PPBS decision-making process?
2. What do you see as the critical timing features of
the two and how do you think this might be improved?
3. After approval in the DSARC process, is the success
of a program determined entirely on the political aspects or
justification in ZBB (PPBS)? Who is the key in the POM
process to uphold the DSARC decision?
4. What are some of the inconsistencies, and how does
this affect the workers?
5. What is the major thrust of ZBB, management or decision
maker?
6. To what extent does the program sponsor contribute to
being the key to a program as you see it? (That is, how does
he go about insuring SECDEF decisions are fully funded?)
7. What is it exactly the POM/DSARC review cycle is
looking for?
8. At what stages of the Acquisition cycle is a program
introduced into the POM cycle?
9. Do the mission sponsors and resource sponsors work




B. Directed to PM's:
1. Hurdles/problems encountered with the POM/DSARC
process?
2. From PM position, how can this be improved?
(Question #1)
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